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Levenbook's account of the harm of murder is subject to the same Epicurean difficulty to which Feinberg's account is subject. Levenbook's central contention is that posthumous harms such as breaking a promise to a dead person or destroying the reputation of a dead person can be understood as losses to that person. Her case for this is based on the claim that the harm of murder can be understood as a loss to the victim, and, if the harm of murder can be so understood, then posthumous harms can also be so understood. Levenbook grants that it is paradoxical to hold that "one can lose something at the moment that he ceases to exist" (p. 415). But she argues that a good reason for making such an assumption is that it "has the advantage of preserving the important pretheoretic conviction that murder harms its victim" (p. 415). If Levenbook is right about this, then why can't Feinberg and the rest of us also make the assumption that one's interest (in particular, one's interest in staying alive) is invaded at the moment one ceases to exist? "Paradoxical" though it may be, a good reason for holding it also is that it "has the advantage of preserving the important pretheoretic conviction that" my murder would invade my interest in staying alive. This resuscitates Feinberg. Again, Levenbook can't have it both ways.
The Epicurean argument does seem to have wildly counterintuitive consequences for the supposed harm of murder or the supposed loss of life. Hence, most of us bracket off that argument in most philosophical contexts to get on with our work on the ethics of killing and related issues. That seems legitimate. The argument seems intractable. The cash value of Partridge's recent paper is that Feinberg's account of posthumous harms does not successfully avoid the Epicurean difficulty.4 It is also legitimate to take that argument seriously, of course. But it will hardly do to use it against others if one is unprepared to accept it as an objection against one's own views! Levenbook (thinking of her own view) admits that "there are, undoubtedly, real difficulties of a metaphysical and metaethical nature in the thesis that someone can be harmed after he no longer exists" (p. 418). Indeed! The lack of specificity of this remark disguises the fact that the major metaphysical difficulty is the Epicurean argument. Either the difficulty is conclusive or it isn't. If it is, then Levenbook's account is unsound. If it is not, then Levenbook has failed to show that Feinberg's analysis is inferior to hers. Hence, Levenbook's analysis is unsound.
Levenbook's position does nothing to dispel the grossly counterintuitive character of claims such as 'The diminution of Einstein's reputation now is a loss to Einstein' because it does nothing to provide us with an understanding of how it is possible for a nonexistent person to suffer a loss (p. 417). The argument that it must be so, otherwise, murder would not be a harm does not resolve the issue. It merely adds to the perplexity.
